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NOTES
EMISSIONS TRADING: A COST-EFFECTIVE
APPROACH TO REDUCING NONPOINT
SOURCE POLLUTION
Sonya Dewan
A significant amount of U.S. water pollution originates from nonpoint sources,' which are "scattered, diffuse sources of pollutants,
such as runoff from farm fields, golf courses, [or] construction
sites." 2 The nation's environment is deteriorating and entire species3
are disappearing due to the ineffective control of nonpoint sources.
The regulation of these sources, particularly agricultural nonpoint
sources, is a complex issue currently facing policy makers.4
Nonpoint sources have been regulated substantially less than point
sources, which are "specific locations of highly concentrated pollution discharge, such as factories, power plants, sewage treatment
plants, underground coal mines, and oil wells." 5 Previous efforts at

1. Barry C. Field, Environmental Economics: An Introduction
287 (1994).
2. See

WILLIAM

P.

CUNNINGHAM,

UNDERSTANDING

OUR

364 (1994).
3. See generally, Environmental Defense, Nonpoint Source Pollution Control: Breaking the Regulatory Stalemate, at http://
www.envtn.org/docs/GTLP-PNG.PDF (last visited Dec. 19, 2004).
4. See Terry F. Young & Joe Karkoski, Green Evolution: Are
Economic Incentives the Next Step in Nonpoint Source Pollution
Control? 2 WATER POL'Y 151, 152 (2000), available at
http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_FarmPollutionWat
erPolicy.pdf.
5. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 2, at 366. See also Susan A. Austin, Designing A Nonpoint Source Selenium Load Trading Program,
25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 337, 339 (2001) (defining nonpoint
ENVIRONMENT: AN INTRODUCTION
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controlling nonpoint source pollution have been unsuccessful, primarily because individual polluters were not held accountable for the
pollution they emitted. 6 For most individual polluters, the cost of
polluting without restraint has always been lower than the cost of
self-regulation. 7 Therefore, to control agricultural nonpoint sources,
policy makers have been searching for a system that will make each
farmer personally accountable for the amount he pollutes. 8 The aim
has been 9to achieve such a system without severely hindering farm
practices.
Regulators have investigated traditional command and control
regulatory schemes for nonpoint source pollution control.' 0 Under a
command and control approach, uniform standards are applied to all
individual polluters.'" Although this achieves a certain level of accountability, this centralized approach to solving environmental
problems has proven costly for polluters.' 2 A command and control
sources as, "discharges, such as farms, timber operations, urban runoff, storm water, erosion, and natural runoff").
6. See Environmental Defense at http://www.envtn.org/docs/
GTLP-PNG.PDF, supra note 3, at 1 (noting "The commonlyaccepted method for controlling nonpoint source pollutionvoluntary adoption of 'Best Management Practices' or BMPs-has
predictably achieved minimal success, particularly in areas where
pollution control expenses are significant.").
7. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in SOURCES:
NOTABLE SELECTIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 39, 42-43
(Theodore D. Goldfarb ed., Dushkin/McGraw-Hill 7th ed., 1997)
(describing pollution as a reverse "tragedy of the commons" as people will pollute so long as it is more cost-effective than proper disposal of wastes).
8. See generally, Environmental Defense, at http://www.
envtn.org/docs/GTLP-PNG.PDF, supra note 3.
9. Id., at http://www.envtn.org/docs/GTLP-PNG.PDF.
10. See Kurt Stephenson, Leonard Shabman, & L. Leon Geyer,
Toward an Effective Watershed-Based Effluent Allowance Trading
System: Identifying the Statutory and Regulatory Barriers to Implementation, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 775 (1999).
11. Lynn Scarlet, Evolutionary Ecology, in TAKING SIDES:
CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 4, 13
(Theodore D. Goldfarb ed., Dushkin/McGraw-Hill 7th ed., 1997).
12. Id.
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system provides polluters with no incentive to attain an optimum
level of pollution.
An alternative to a command and control system would be a tradable emissions program.' 4 Under this approach, polluters are encouraged to act responsibly because doing so is cost-effective. 15 In
an emissions trading system the government establishes an aggregate
emissions limit for each region. 16 Permits are then distributed to
individual polluters in an area according to the established emissions
limit.' 7 The tradable emission permits consequently create a market
within the region, allowing individuals to buy and sell the right to
pollute. 18 Although both command and control regulation and emissions trading may reduce nonpoint source pollution, a review of rethat a tradable permit syscent trading programs has demonstrated
19
cost-effective.
more
be
to
likely
tem is
13. See generally Stephenson, Shabman & Geyer, supra note 10
(arguing that command and control systems prevent new technology
from emerging and do not provide cost-effective pollution control).
14. See Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle, & Terry L. Anderson,
Principlesfor Water, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 335, 336-56 (2002) (establishing principles to use in evaluating command and control regulation of water pollution verses a market approach).
15. Austin, supra note 5, at 343 (arguing that economic instruments could reduce the economic cost of achieving a certain environmental standard in comparison to command and control regulatory policies); See also Stephenson, Shabman & Geyer, supra note
10.
16. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., EVALUATING
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 17 (1997);
see also Stephenson, Shabman & Geyer, supra note 10, at 781; Lily
N. Chinn, Can the Market Be Fairand Efficient? An Environmental
Justice Critique of Emissions Trading, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 80, 88-89
(1999).
17. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 16, at 17;
see also Stephenson, Shabman & Geyer, supra note 11, at 781.
18. See id.; see also Morris, Yandle & Anderson, supra note 14,
at 336.
19. See Austin, supra note 5, at 343 (explaining that the flexibility
given to polluters through the use of economic instruments helps
reduce the cost of attaining a particular level of environmental protection); see also Environmental Defense, at http://www.
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An emissions trading program must meet five criteria in order to
be effective: 1) polluters within the trading region must be given an
incentive to meet water quality standards; 2) a locally controlled
agency has to regulate polluters and enforce pollution limits; 3) there
must be a cap on the amount of discharge allowed; 4) a system to
monitor polluters must be in place; and 5) there must be a likelihood
that differences exist in the marginal cost of reducing pollution
among the various regional polluters. Region-specific programs
meeting these criteria should thus be able to create markets for permits. As a result, through the creation of such markets, nonpoint
source pollution may be reduced at the lowest possible cost.
Part I of this Note provides a brief background of water pollution
policy in the United States. It discusses the inadequacy of previous
regulation methods and the difficulties presented by the regulation of
nonpoint source pollution. This Part also introduces the use of tradable emissions in the water context. Part H discusses the economic
incentives of using tradable permits, and explains how tradable permits can reduce nonpoint source pollution at a lower cost than command and control regulation. Part III discusses the challenges of
designing an effective tradable permit system. Finally, Part IV examines the Selenium Load Trading Program of California's San Joaquin Valley. This program was able to overcome the perceived challenges to satisfy the five conditions this author suggests are necessary for a successful trading program. This Part also explains how
the fulfillment of each requirement facilitated trade within the region.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
IN THE UNITED STATES

In order to realize the benefits of regulating nonpoint source water
pollution through tradable emission permits, it is important to explore the evolution of water pollution policy concerning nonpoint
sources. Examination of past difficulties encountered in the regula-

envtn.org/docs/GTLP-PNG.PDF, supra note 3 (explaining that economic incentives from trading program in Grassland Drainage Area
provided financial rewards for innovative pollution control methods).
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tion of nonpoint source pollution shall highlight the benefits of using
an economic approach to address this problem.
The desire to regulate nonpoint source pollution is relatively new,
and, until recently, control of nonpoint sources has been predominantly weak. 20 Limited prior to the 1970s, 21 the federal role in pollution control expanded with the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in 1970, and further grew with the passage of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, often referred to as the
Clean Water Act ("CWA"), in 1972.22 The CWA effectively established federal water pollution policy.
For the most part, the CWA does not address nonpoint source pollution.23 Rather, the Act distinguishes between point source and
nonpoint source pollution. 24 Although the CWA regulates point
source pollution, agricultural discharges are specifically exempt
from regulation, 25 resulting in inadequate control of these nonpoint
pollution sources.26
Unable to rely upon nonpoint source regulation, environmental
groups have focused on Section 303(d) of the CWA in their attempts
27
Section
to bring these sources under government regulation.
303(d) requires that states "identify water bodies for which technology-based effluent limitations are not stringent enough to meet water
quality standards, to establish a priority ranking of those waters, and
to establish a Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") at the level

20. See Austin, supra note 5, at 337.
21. See A. Myrick Freeman II, Environmental Policy Since Earth
Day I: What Have We Gained? 16 No. 1 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 125
(Winter 2002); see also FIELD, supra note 1, at 268-69 (noting that
primary legislation pre-1970 consisted of the 1899 Refuse Act, the
1948 Water Pollution Control Act, the 1956 WPCA Amendments
and the 1965 Water Quality Act).
22. Freeman, supra note 21, at 136; see also, Scarlet, supra note
11, at 166.
23. Freeman, supra note 21, at 137.
24. Austin, supra note 5, at 339.
25. Id. at 340 (asserting that the CWA regulates point source pollution with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, a
program that specifically exempts nonpoint source pollution).
26. See id.
27. Id. at 341.
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,,28

necessary to meet water quality standards.
A TMDL establishes
how much pollution can be discharged into a local water body, and
dictates who is allowed to pollute at a particular level. 29 TMDLs are
required for every location failing30 to meet water quality standards
under current regulatory programs.
In response to the efforts of environmental groups, the EPA began
to recognize nonpoint source pollution as a serious environmental
problem. 3' The EPA now requires TMDL allocations for nonpoint
sources, deriving its authority to do so from the TMDL provisions of
the CWA.3 2 In addition, caselaw has established that the EPA has
the ultimate authority to require and enforce state regulation of nonpoint sources, despite the belief held by some that regulation of these
sources should be left solely to states. 3 3 Due to heightened awareness of the dangers these pollution sources pose, load allocations for
34
nonpoint sources are becoming more common.
In the past nonpoint sources, particularly farms, have not been subject to much control. 35 Nonpoint source regulation has been neglected largely due to a lack of federal legislation resulting from perceived difficulties in creating and enforcing any attempt at regulation. 36 Regulating nonpoint source pollution is thought to be a tremendous task requiring the control of numerous "small, independent,
38
diverse pollution discharges" that are therefore hard to monitor.

28. Id.; see also, Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 303(d), 33
U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
29. Austin, supra note 5, at 341.
30. Id. at 341-42.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1354
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (permitting EPA to withhold grant money from
states that refuse to implement TMDLs).
34. Austin, supra note 5, at 341-42.
35. Id., at Policy.pdf, at 152-153.
36. Young & Karkoski, available at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_FarmPoluutionWaterPolicy.pdf, supra
note 4 at 152.
37. Id., at Policy.pdf, at 152.
38. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
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These perceived difficulties led most programs striving to reduce
agricultural nonpoint source pollution to request voluntary adherence
to Best Management Practices ("BMPs"). 39 BMPs are procedures
that regulate the amount of pollution that enters a particular water
source and are applied during several stages of the pollution producing activity.40 Voluntary use of BMPs have not, however, sufficiently reduced nonpoint source pollution.4 1 The essential problem
with these prior programs is that they were voluntary. As a result,
they did not hold individual farmers accountable for their pollution.43
Farmers saw costs with few benefits resulting from their adherence
to BMPs, and thus were disinclined to comply.4 4 Mandatory programs, on the other hand, were thought to be administratively and
economically impractical.4 5
Recently, Congress has incorporated economic efficiency standards into several environmental laws. 4 6 This has provided individ47
ual polluters with economic incentives to reduce their emissions.
production
An economic incentive encourages an individual to focus
48
directions.
beneficial
economically
and consumption in

39. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
40. Austin, supra note 5, at 340.
41. Young & Karkoski, at http://environmentaldefense.org/
documents/654_FarmPollutionWaterPolicy.pdf, supra note 4, at
152.
42. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
43. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf, at 153.
44. Id., at _WaterPolicy.pdf, at 152.
45. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
46. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf (referring to the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act of 1976 and the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996,
as three major environmental laws in which Congress has incorporated economic efficiency criteria).
47. FIELD, supra note 1, at 3.
48. Id. at 5.
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At first, Congress specifically rejected using an economic approach to establishing environmental goals, particularly in the areas
of clean air and clean water. 49 However, the use of tradable emission permits has subsequently gained acceptance as a valid technique
for pollution reduction.
Congress first acknowledged the feasibility of tradable emission
programs in the Clean Air Act amendments of 1977.51 Further
amendments in 1990 expanded the availability of trading programs,
making emissions trading an acceptable means for achieving goals
set for acid rain reduction.52 Emissions trading programs are now
commonly used in air pollution regulation. 53 The benefits of emissions trading have recently been realized in water pollution control
as well 54 in programs modeled after those created to reduce air pollu55
tion.
II.

TRADABLE EMISSIONS PERMITS: POLLUTION REDUCTION AT A
LOWER COST THAN COMMAND AND CONTROL REGULATION

For the last century policy makers have used "command and control" regulation to address most environmental issues. 56 Under this
49. Freeman, supra note 21, at 126 (noting that Congress in the
early 1970s, in the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution
Act, rejected an economic approach and focused on protecting human health and fishable and swimable water quality).
50. See generally Richard E. Ayres, Expanding the Use of Environmental Trading Programs Into New Areas of Environimental
Regulation, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 87, 91 (2000).
51. Id. at 92; see also Chinn, supra note 16, at 87-88.
52. Id.
53. Ayres, supra note 50, at 91; see also ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., supra note 16, at 57.
54. See Ayres, supra note 50, at 88 (describing initial trading programs in both the air and water context); see generally Austin, supra

note 5, at 341 (illustrating the benefits of an emissions trading area
in the Grassland Drainage Area of the San Joaquin Valley in California).
55. See Austin, supra note 5, at 343-44 (asserting that insight to a
market based approach can be found in the air emissions context).
56. Morriss, Yandle & Anderson, supra note 14, at 335.
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centralized approach, the EPA sets uniform standards and requires
the use of specific technologies. 57 Reducing pollution through command and control regulation, however, is likely to be more costly
than via a decentralized emissions trading program. 58 Trading programs provide a more cost-effective solution to pollution reduction
by maximizing the use of local information and by providing polluters the incentive to reach their optimum level of pollution, both of
which have encouraged technological development and experimentation.59
Obtaining the information needed to regulate nonpoint sources is
usually more costly under a command and control system than in a
trading program.60 The federal EPA is less likely than a local
agency to have detailed information about the pollution problems of
a given body of water already on hand. 6 1 A national agency, like the
EPA, is also likely to spend money and time gathering more information than is necessary to deal with a specific problem. Trading
programs, on the other hand, optimize the use of local knowledge by
giving regulatory power to a locally controlled agency. 63 It is likely
that a local agency already possesses much of the needed data, is
more aware of the information needed to accurately address the particular problem, and is more capable of acquiring that information at

57. See Scarlet, supra note 11, at 13.
58. See generally Morriss, Yandle & Anderson, supra note 14, at
335 (comparing command and control regulatory schemes to market
regulation of water by focusing on ten principals); see also FIELD,
supra note 1, at 383 (asserting that experimentation in the GDA
would have been less likely if the use of specific technologies had
been required).
59. See FIELD, supra note 1, at 259, 271 (predicting that trading
programs will result in pollution control at a substantially lower cost
than technology based effluent standards, standards used by the EPA
in command and control regulation in requiring the use of certain
technologies).
60. See Morriss, Yandle & Anderson, supra note 14, at 338.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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a lower cost. 64 These advantages make a local agency better suited
to determine and enforce pollution limits than the centralized EPA.65
Trading programs, unlike command and control regulation, provide financial incentives for polluters to reach the pollution level that
66
is the most cost-effective for their own individualized interests.
These incentives encourage market activity (such as bargaining)
among polluters and support the development of new pollutionreducing technologies. 67 Tradable emissions programs achieve these
results by using a cap-and-trade, market-based approach.68 Under
this approach, the government determines the total amount of pollution a particular region is allowed to emit. 69 A local agency then
divides that total pollution amount into marketable permits, which
are then assigned to individual parties. 70 The permits can be bought
and sold among parties, allowing each party to determine its own
most economical pollution level. 7' While it may be more costeffective for some parties to pollute at or above the allotted level,
others have the incentive to develop new pollution reduction technologies or to change their overall method of production. 72 As a
result, farmers are induced to choose their optimal level of pollution.
This is unlike what occurs under a command and control system,
where uniform pollution levels are set, deployment of certain technologies required, and trading proscribed.73

64. See id.
65. See generally Morriss, Yandle & Anderson, supra note 14.
66. Chinn, supra note 16, at 89.
67. Scarlet, supra note 11, at 13.
68. Chinn, supra note 16, at 88-89.
69. Id. at 89; see also Austin, supra note 5, at 348.
70. Chinn, supra note 16, at 89.
71. Id.
72. Scarlet, supra note 11, at 13.
73. Id.; see also Chinn, supra note 16, at 89; see also Austin, supra note 5, at 383.
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III. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES IN APPLYING
TRADABLE EMISSIONS PERMITS

Tradable emissions permits can only work where well-functioning
markets for permits may be created. 74 If the proposed five requirements for a successful trading program are met, the genesis of a
market environment will ensue due to the incentive to trade. Meeting
these requirements, however, may pose a problem for policy makers
in certain regions.
The first requirement of an emission trading market is an incentive
sufficient to motivate polluters to meet water quality standards. This
requirement is fundamental to a successful trading system. If polluters perceive the environment as owned by no one, they are likely to
pollute at any level they choose. 75 Despite a recent emphasis on environmental preservation, morals and ethics alone will not encourage
polluters to reduce the amount they pollute. 76 Economic incentives,
on the other hand, are more likely to encourage polluters to meet
water quality standards.7 7 If the economic incentives from tradable
permits are insufficient motivation for polluters the trading program
will not work. 8
The second requirement is a locally controlled agency directly
regulating polluters and enforcing their pollution limits. Since most
water pollution problems are specific to a particular region, 79 a regional regulatory agency is likely to be better informed of the issues.
Therefore, this agency will be more effective in assigning permits

74. See Ayres, supra note 50, at 87.
75. Scarlet, supra note 11, at 7.
76. FELD, supra note 1, at 4-5.
77. Id.
78. See generally Austin, supra note 5, at 337 (stating that if dischargers incur same marginal cost curve there will not be enough
incentive to trade, and as a result, the trading program will not
work); see also Dennis M. King, Managing Environmental Trades:
Lessons From Hollywood, Stockholm, and Houston, 32 ENVTL. L.
REP. 11317 (2002) (asserting that if trading rules established by
regulators are too strict trading may be inhibited).
79. See generally FIELD, supra note 1, at 290.
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and implementing rules. 80 Polluters must be regulated directly, and
control by a local agency effectively achieves this goal. 81
The third requirement, a cap on the total amount of pollution the
region can emit, provides a "baseline" to structure a trading program. 2 Several methods can be used to establish a discharge cap.83
One possibility includes implementing a TMDL; another contemplates legislation at the state level. 84 Complications may arise in
establishing a cap; 85 for example, data needed for setting a cap becomes difficult to obtain when the pollutants break down into other
chemicals in the environment. 86 If it is impossible to calculate a cap
for allowable pollution, there will be no baseline on which to create
a market. 87 Furthermore, even if a cap can be set on the amount of
discharge permitted, problems might arise in attempting to assign
permits and establish trading rules.
Due to the nature of nonpoint source pollution, the fourth requirement-a measurement system to monitor polluters-is one of the
most important issues that must be addressed when designing such a
trading program. While monitoring nonpoint source pollution levels
is extremely difficult, discharge amounts and reductions must be
measured and estimated to establish a viable trading program. 89 if
pollution levels cannot be monitored, enforcement of pollution limits
9° The cost of creating
will
a monitoring
mechanism
mustbe
beimpossible.
weighed against
the benefits of creating
an emissions
mar80. See Austin, supra note 5, at 351 (describing the importance of
a regional agency in the Grassland Drainage Area).
81. Young & Karkoski, available at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_FarmPollutionWaterPolicy.pdf, supra note
4, at 167; see generally, ORG. FOR EcON. Co-OPERATION & DEV.,
supra note 16, at 351.
82. Ayres, supra note 50, at 109.
83. See Austin, supra note 5, at 389.
84. Id.
85. See Ayres, supra note 50, at 109.
86. Id.
87. Id.; see also ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION & DEV., supra
note 16, at 17.
88. FIELD, supra note 1, at 260; see also Austin, supra note 5, at
352-53.
89. Austin, supra note 5, at 390.
90. See id.
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the total benefit, emissions trading would
ket. 9' If the cost exceeds
92
advantageous.
not be
The fifth requirement essential for a functioning is the existence of
differences among dischargers in their marginal costs of reducing
pollution. In other words, the cost associated with reducing pollution by some small amount must vary for different polluters if there
is to be any incentive to trade. 93 If the region does not include some
polluters with the incentive to continue polluting and some polluters
with the incentive to reduce pollution, through the development of a
new technology or the use of different agricultural methods for example, there will be no incentive to trade.94 Trading will only occur
95
if there are parties that have different optimum levels of pollution.
IV. DESIGN OF A SUCCESSFUL TRADING PROGRAM:
THE GRASSLAND DRAINAGE AREA

One emissions trading program for nonpoint source water pollution has proven particularly successful, despite the challenges it
faced. The Selenium Load Trading Program ("SLTP") in the Grassland Drainage Area ("GDA"), an agricultural region of California's
San Joaquin Valley, was one of the first successful trading programs
to adequately reduce nonpoint source pollution in the nation.96 Built
into this program are the five criteria this author proposes as necessary for any successful emissions trading program. An analysis of
the SLTP highlights the importance of these criteria in any trading
program to reduce nonpoint source pollution.
91. Id. at 385.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 390; see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW &
ECONOMICS 20-21 (Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 3rd ed., 2000).
94. See Austin, supra note 5, at 390; see also Young & Karkoski,
available at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf, supra note 4, at 156 (asserting that marginal cost differences will affect the magnitude of cost savings in a
trading program).
95. See also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 93, at 20-21.
96. Susan A. Austin, The Tradable Loads Program in the Grassland Drainage Area, at http://ageco.tamu.edu/faculty/woodward/
et/grassland.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2000).
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An Incentive to Meet Water Quality Standards
Although the GDA received national attention in 1983, when farm
drainage high in selenium caused deformed baby birds in the Keterson Reservoir, farmers did not appreciably reduce the amount they
polluted. 97 Drainage high in selenium posed a threat to many wildlife species, necessitating a reduction of drainage discharge to meet
water quality standards. 98 Yet, after eight years of encouraging voluntary BMPs, such a program has proven unsuccessful in improving
water quality. 99 Voluntary adherence to BMPs did not result in a
00
sufficient decrease in nonpoint source pollution.'
Economic incentives, as an alternative to BMPs, were proposed in
1994 by the Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") to control the
selenium problem.10 1 The EDF argued that there were advantages to
using tradable discharge permits among irrigation districts.0 2 The
plan proposed to make the districts directly responsible for their pollution discharges, giving them incentive to try to reach their optimal
pollution level. 10 3 A variety of practices have been implemented by
districts, following the implementation of this trading program, including newsletters and other forms of communications among
97. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Grassland Bypass Project: Economic Incentives Help Improve Water Quality, §319 Success Stories,
Vol. I1, at http://www.epa.gov.owow/nps/Section319l/CA.htm
(last visited Dec. 19, 2004); see also Young & Karkoski, available
at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_FarmPollution_
WaterPolicy.pdf, supra note 4, at 152-53.
98. Young & Karkoski, at http://environmentaldefense.org/
documents/654_FarmPollutionWaterPolicy.pdf, supra note 4, at
153.
99. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
100. See id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654
FarmPollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
101. Id.,
at
http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654
_FarmPollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
102. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf, at 152-53.
103. See generally Young & Karkoski, available at
http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_FarmPollutionWat
erPolicy.pdf, supra note 4, at 152-62.
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irrigation systems and the use
farmers, the installation of improved
10 4
system.
recycling
of a drainage
A Measurement System That Monitors Polluters
05
The SLTP has developed a unique pollution monitoring system.
Drainage is collected in underground pipes located on each farm.'0 6
This drainage is then conveyed to a swamp at the end of the field and
pumped into district pipes or canals that transport it to a discharge
point outside the district.' 0 7 Metering of swamp discharges and periodic measurement of salinity and selenium concentrations make
tracking of individual farm discharges possible. 10 8 Another method
used is the measurement of water inputs as an alternative to pollution
outputs.o 9
Measurement systems were an essential part of the design of the
trading program in the GDA. 110 The program first assigns a pollution limit to each district, then creates a penalty structure to enforce

104. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/
Section319III/CA.htm, supra note 97.
105. Compare Young & Karkoski, available at http://environmentaldfense.org/documents/654 FarmPollutionWaterPolicy.pdf,
supra note 4, at 154, with Rock River Watershed Group, Summary
of Watershed Studies 3, at http://clean-water.uwex.edu/rockriver/
summary%20PDFs/volumell.pdf (August, 2000) (on file with the
Fordham Environmental Law Journal) (describing measurement system in the Rock River Pilot project which involves a model developed for this particular region called the Soil and Water Assessment
Tool).
106. Young & Karkoski, at http://environmentaldefense.org/
documents/654_FarmPollutionWaterPolicy.pdf, supra note 4, at
154.
107. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
108. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
109. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
110. Austin, supra note 5, at 352-53.
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the limits, and finally establishes trade rules."'
Each of these steps
112
mechanisms.
monitoring
requires dependable
A Cap on Allowable Discharge
The Agreement for Use of the San Luis Drain ("Use Agreement"),
a five-year contract between the United States Bureau of Reclamation and the Grassland Area Farmers, establishes and legally en-3
forces a cap on the amount of discharge permissible for the region. 1
The cap essentially provided a regulatory framework for the irrigation districts and for the farmers to develop an emissions trading program. 14

Under this agreement the regions' farmers are permitted to use a
federal canal, the San Luis Drain ("The Drain"), which transports
drainage directly into one specific river tributary bypassing wildlife6
refuges. 115 The farmers are not permitted to discharge elsewhere.'
The Use Agreement specifies the amounts of selenium that can be
discharged per month and per year. 17 For the first two years the cap
on permissible pollution was established at the historical regional
average, and each subsequent year thereafter the permissible pollution level will decrease at a set percentage. 1 8 If discharges should
ever exceed 120% of the annual cap on allowable selenium, the
farmers will lose the right to use the Drain."19 There are very few

Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 348-51; see also Young & Karkoski, at
http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_FarmPollutionWat
erPolicy.pdf, supra note 4, at 157 (asserting that an extensive monitoring program was also required under the agreement recognizing
that violations of water quality standards might still occur).
114. See generally Austin, supra note 5.
115. Young & Karkoski, at http://environmentaldefense.org/
documents/654_FarmPollutionWaterPolicy.pdf, supra note 4, at
156.
116. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
117. Austin, supra note 5, at 351-52.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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exceptions to the 120% limit, the primary 2exception
being "unfore0
circumstances.'
uncontrollable"
and
seeable
A Locally Controlled Agency That Regulates Pollutersand Enforces
PollutionLimits
The organization of the GDA supported the creation of agencies
that could locally regulate and enforce pollution limits.121 Farms
were grouped into irrigation and/or drainage districts, each responsible for its own water allocation and drainage problems. 122 The districts that diverted drainage into the Drain formed an entity called
the Grassland Area Farmers ("GAF"). 123 The governing body of the
GAF, the Grassland Basin Drainage Steering Committee ("Steering
Committee"), consists of representatives from each district. 124 Rules
for the Steering Committee were agreed upon among the representatives and formalized in the "Activity Agreement."'' 2 5 Finally, an
executive officer of the Steering Committee, the Regional Drainage
The Coordinator's duties include
Coordinator, was appointed.
collecting and processing regional information, preparing reports and
representing the GAF at meetings and hearings.
Once established, this local agency was able to focus on the concerns of the particular region and determine the best methods to
120. Id. at 363-74 (defining "unforeseeable and uncontrollable"
circumstances to generally mean uncontrollable acts of God; also,
noting that in 1998, an El Nifio year, the heavy rainfall was deemed
an "unforeseeable and uncontrollable" circumstance and fees for
exceeding load allocations were waived).
& Karkoski, available at
121. See generally Young
http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_FarmPollutionWat
erPolicy.pdf, supra note 4, at 153-55.
122. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf, at 154-55.
123. Austin, supra note 5, at 351.
124. Id.
125. Id. (declaring that under the Activity Agreement a unanimous
vote of present Steering Committee members is required and ratification of rules by each district is necessary before rules go into effect).
126. Id.
127. Id.

250

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W REVIEW

[VOL. XV

regulate and enforce pollution limits. The GAF met regularly with
this as their overarching goal. 128 On June 26, 1998, the "Rule Establishing a Tradable Loads Program for Water Year 1998" was
adopted. 129 This Rule determined the boundaries of acceptable
trades, taking into consideration the discharge limits established under the Use Agreement.' 30 Under this Rule, trading was allowed in
any increment and for any form of consideration, as long as the pollution limits established for the particular region were not exceeded.'3' Trading was only
permitted among those that could dis32
Drain.'
the
through
charge
Although a reduction in pollution was realized under the 1998
Rule, the Steering Committee farmers modified the Rule to make it
even more effective based on the results observed during that
year. 133 The Steering Committee, leveraging its close connection to
the farmers, was able to establish a Rule that increased accountability, essentially facilitating trade within the region. 134 The modifications to the 1998 Rule were instituted in the "Rule Enforcing Selenium Load Allocation and Establishing a Tradable Load Program for
Water Year 1999.' 135 The new Rule authorized the Steering Committee to levy a fine or impose restrictions on a district that surpassed discharge allocations. Sanctions were possible even if over-

128. See generally Young
& Karkoski, available at
http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_FarmPollutionWat
erPolicy.pdf, supra note 4, at 158-59.
129. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf, at 159.
130. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
131. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
132. Austin, supra note 5, at 365.
133. See Young & Karkoski, available at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_FarmPollutionWaterPolicy.pdf,
supra note 4, at 160.
134. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
135. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
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all regional allocations were not exceeded.1 36 In addition, the Rule
requires districts exceeding discharge allocations to pay penalties
both under the Use Agreement and under a rebate provision, establishing a fund from which group members who discharge less than
their allotted amount could be compensated.' 3 7
The rebate system implemented under the 1999 Rule is an illustration of the benefit of having a local agency that regulates and enforces pollution limits. In theory, a market that is functioning properly would obviate the necessity for a rebate system. 138 The Steering
Committee, however, was able to cater to the specific needs of the
GAF and determined that rebates would temporarily assist the market in achieving the least costly solution to selenium reduction. 39
The Steering Committee took care to set the rebate amount low
enough not to distort this particular market. 140 Since the Committee
was local to the region, it could observe unique problems that would
hinder trading and effectively resolve these matters.
Differences Among Polluters in the Marginal Cost of
Reducing Pollution
District managers were unsure whether differences existed among
polluters in their marginal costs of reducing pollution at the time the
trading program was implemented. 41 Once the plan was in place,
however, marginal cost differences were realized and trading occurred. 142 Although it is not imperative to know beforehand the exact differences in marginal costs of polluting, it is imperative that
143
they exist for effective trading.

136. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf.
137. Id., at http://environmentaldefense.org/documents/654_Farm
PollutionWaterPolicy.pdf; see also Austin, supra note 5, at 361.
138. Austin, supra note 5, at 361.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Austin, supra note 5, at 390.
143. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Nonpoint source water pollution poses a serious threat to our environment and has recently received much attention from policy makers. Voluntary Best Management Practices have proven to be ineffective in reducing such pollution. The EPA, deriving its authority
from the Clean Water Act, has started taking stronger action against
nonpoint source polluters by establishing total maximum daily loads
for locations that do not currently meet water quality standards.
The market trading of emissions allocations has been offered as an
alternative to traditional command and control regulation of nonpoint source pollution. Experience has shown that such a marketbased approach to pollution reduction can effectively reduce nonpoint source pollution, and may do so economically. Economic pollution reduction may be achieved through the premise that trading
programs provide polluters with an incentive to meet their optimum
level of pollution.
A tradable emissions program requires a functioning market where
there are incentives and benefits to trade. Five conditions that are
necessary to establish such a market within a particular region are: 1)
an incentive for polluters within the region to meet water quality
standards; 2) a locally controlled agency that regulates polluters and
enforces pollution limits; 3) a cap on the amount of discharge that
will be allowed; 4) a measurement system that monitors polluters;
and 5) the likelihood that differences exist among individual polluters in the marginal cost of reducing pollution. Satisfying these conditions may pose a problem in designing an emissions trading program. Where these criteria can be met, as they have been in the Selenium Load Trading Program of the San Joaquin Grassland Drainage Area, a trading program that effectively and economically reduces nonpoint source pollution should result.

